Precarious Alliances: Turkey, Israel, Öcalan, and the Kurds Amid Shifting Middle Eastern Geopolitics

The Handshake That Shook Turkey

During the opening session of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM) on October 1, 2024, the Chairman of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), Devlet Bahçeli, shook hands with members of the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM Party). This seemingly spontaneous gesture marked the beginning of an unexpected and complex political process in Turkey, involving a wide array of domestic, regional, and global actors. He explained the motivation behind this gesture with a remarkable statement: “While borders are being redrawn around us and the global system is being shaken to its roots, our parliament will guide both our country and our geography with dignity, common sense, and consensus.”[1]

Bahçeli, the long-time leader of the ultra-nationalist MHP, whose supporters, self-identified as Gray Wolves —after the mythical symbol of Turkish history, revered for its guiding and protective role of leadership and resilience, and who embody fervent anti-Kurdish politics—was the least likely figure to initiate a political dialogue addressing the country’s long-standing Kurdish issue. Yet, this act, small in appearance but monumental in implication, hinted at a potential shift in Turkey’s approach to the Kurdish question.

Shortly after the handshake, Bahçeli delivered a speech that stunned many. He proposed inviting Abdullah Öcalan to address the Turkish parliament in a bid to end the decades-long conflict between the Turkish state and Kurdish insurgents.[2] Öcalan, currently serving a life sentence on a small island in the Sea of Marmara, is widely regarded as the leader of the PKK, a Kurdish guerrilla organization that has waged one of the most enduring insurgencies against Turkey since the 1980s. Over the decades, the PKK has expanded its influence, establishing branches in Iran, Iraq, and Syria—countries where Kurds form sizable minorities. While numerous Kurdish parties, both outlawed and legal, operate in these four states, the PKK, except for Iraqi Kurdistan, remains the dominant force, weaving the Kurdish questions in these states into a complex and interconnected struggle. This prominence has solidified Öcalan as the ultimate adversary of Turkish nationalists for decades.

Bahçeli, as a leading figure in anti-Kurdish politics, has been one of Öcalan’s fiercest opponents. His opposition was so extreme that, during a political rally in 2007, Bahçeli dramatically threw a noose to his cheering supporters, publicly urging then-Prime Minister Erdoğan to execute Öcalan with it. For such a staunch nationalist to now advocate for Öcalan’s participation in the political process represents a seismic shift, both symbolically and politically.

On the same date as the handshake, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Bahçeli’s coalition partner, issued another highly unexpected and perplexing statement. Erdoğan stated, “The Israeli administration, acting under the delusion of the ‘Promised Land’ and driven entirely by religious fanaticism, will set its sights on our homeland after Palestine and Lebanon. Currently, all calculations are based on this.”[3] Erdoğan has long used anti-Israeli rhetoric as a political tool to bolster support both at home and abroad, all while maintaining Turkey’s trade and military partnerships with Israel. This statement, however, stands out for its ominous undertone and focus on Turkey as a direct target, hinting at a recalibration of Erdoğan’s foreign policy amidst shifting regional dynamics. As coalition partners, Erdoğan and Bahçeli’s statements must be considered together to grasp the underlying dynamics of this unexpected Kurdish initiative.

The ongoing negotiation process with Öcalan and other Kurdish political actors since Bahçeli’s handshake and Erdoğan’s comments—widely referred to as a new peace process—has many intriguing aspects. It has taken everyone by surprise, much like the recent toppling of Assad in neighboring Syria. Similar to Assad’s abrupt departure, there had been no prior indications of such an initiative. Many argue there was no immediate necessity for it, given that the PKK had largely scaled back its military operations against Turkey since the collapse of the last peace process nearly a decade ago. However, as discussions progressed and key actors voiced their perspectives, it became clear that the new process in Turkey is fundamentally about addressing the Kurdish question in Syria, not necessarily the one in Turkey. This was initially unclear since the process of ousting Assad had not yet begun. However, it indicates that Turkish leaders had anticipated the developments in Syria—unsurprising given Turkey’s close relationship with the groups responsible for Assad’s overthrow.

Enemies and Allies: The Kurdish Struggle in a Shifting Geopolitical Landscape

As I already hinted, the answer to all these lies in Syria, and partially in Iran. When the various pieces of the puzzle are assembled, it becomes evident that Turkey perceives itself as fundamentally threatened by recent developments in Syria. This may seem counterintuitive, given that the new administration in Syria is composed of groups with strong ties to the Turkish government and is expected to implement pro-Turkish policies in the emerging Syrian order. Furthermore, Iran’s recent setbacks in Syria and Lebanon, coupled with its growing vulnerability to hostile actions by Israel and the United States, would seemingly benefit Turkey—a key regional rival, particularly in Syria. Yet, Turkish leaders interpret these events differently.

Turkey’s close relationship with Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the group responsible for the recent overthrow of the Assad regime, positions Turkey to potentially target Kurdish forces in Syria, leveraging the new Damascus administration, which owes much of its resurgence to Turkish backing. The issue lies in the continuing presence of some and the disappearance of other influential actors in Syria, with the new administration unable to enforce its agenda across the entire country. Chief among the remaining actors are the Kurds and their American allies. More alarmingly for Turkey is Israel’s support for Kurdish autonomy, an additional incentive for continued US support for the Syrian Kurds. Most recently, Isreal’s Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar told the Jerusalem Post “In conversations I’ve had with foreign ministers worldwide - from [US Secretary of State] Antony Blinken to others - I’ve stressed the international community’s responsibility to [protect] the Kurds.”[4] These circumstances render the continued American presence in Syria, along with Israel’s involvement, a deeply concerning scenario for Turkey.

Almost entirely removed from the Syrian political scene are, of course, Ira and Russia. Turkey’s concerns about the Kurdish question were, at least temporarily, aligned with Iran’s presence in Syria, as both countries share an anti-Kurdish vision. This alignment meant that Turkey tolerated, and in some instances welcomed, Iran’s involvement in the region as it countered Kurdish autonomy ambitions. More importantly, over a decade-long Syrian conflict, Turkey has masterfully exploited the carefully engineered balance between Russia and the U.S. for its own interests in Syria, which has almost exclusively been shaped around preventing the formation of a Kurdish autonomous region. In operations like Afrin in 2018, Russia played a pivotal role by withdrawing its troops from the region and granting Turkey access to Syrian airspace, enabling Ankara to target Kurdish-controlled areas beyond the territories under U.S. protection. For Russia, abandoning the Kurds—largely allied with the U.S.—in exchange for securing a formidable ally and a major NATO member like Turkey in the Syrian conflict zone was a strategic feast.

This balancing act allowed Turkey to exploit the competition between Russia and the U.S., leveraging each side to advance its goals against the Kurds. However, Russia’s recent withdrawal following the collapse of the Assad regime has significantly complicated Turkey’s strategy. Without Russia’s mediating influence or its ability to pressure Kurdish groups, Turkey now faces a more constrained geopolitical environment, reliant solely on managing its relationship with the U.S., which continues to back the Syrian Kurds. This shift underscores the challenges Turkey faces in adapting to a new regional landscape where its unilateral actions are met with fewer opportunities for external balancing. The elimination of Russia and Iran from Syria boosted Israel’s role as a major pro-Kurdish and American ally in the region, significantly escalating Turkey’s anxieties.

Why Do Turkey’s Leaders Fear Israel’s Regional Agenda?

The connection between Turkey’s growing anxieties around the Kurdish issue and Israel’s role in Syria became evident in Erdoğan’s speech in Diyarbakır, the symbolic capital of Kurdistan, on January 11, 2025. He said something quite original after the usual cliché of underscoring the unity between Turks and Kurds and cautioning against external forces seeking to create division. In a pointed critique of those among the Kurds who welcome Israeli support, Erdoğan accused them of betraying the legacy of Saladin, the legendary Kurdish Muslim leader celebrated for his role in the fight against the Crusades. He then declared, “No one can make the descendants of Saladin servants or slaves at the door of the Zionists.”[5] This statement encapsulates Erdoğan’s perspective on recent developments, reflecting his imperial nostalgia for a sultanic role over Muslims and his growing alarm over the prospect of more direct Israeli support for the Kurds.

Turkey’s policies regarding the de facto autonomous Kurdish administration in northeastern Syria, which stands on the brink of gaining de jure status in the aftermath of Assad’s downfall, reflects Turkey’s regret over its inability to prevent the establishment of an autonomous Kurdish region in Iraq during the 1990s amid the political upheaval of the Gulf War. Israel’s open support for Kurdish autonomy both in Iraq and in Syria intensifies these fears. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was the only head of state to publicly endorse the 2017 Kurdish independence referendum in Iraq. For Israel, Kurdish autonomy in Syria carries even greater significance due to Syria’s geographic proximity and the Islamist factions currently in power. Israel regards the pro-Western Kurdish movements both in Syria and in Iraq as potential allies in an increasingly Islamist political landscape in the region.

For the Kurds, Israel’s support is crucial, as it could facilitate a sustained American presence in northeastern Syria, offering a much-needed protective buffer against a likely Turkish invasion. This protection is particularly vital given the Kurds’ vulnerable position and their bitter memory of President Trump’s first term, during which he permitted Turkey to invade parts of Kurdish-controlled Syria. That invasion, which was carried out with the help of Turkey’s Syrian proxies, known as the Syrian National Army, resulted in the ethnic cleansing of Kurds in areas such as Afrin. More recently, France, Italy, and Germany have expressed support for the Kurds in Syria, increasing international pressure on Turkey and complicating its aggressive policies. However, without active American involvement, those European states are unlikely to effectively deter Turkey from advancing its ambitions.

Turkey’s anxieties over the Kurdish question are further intensified by another Israel-related factor: growing tensions with Iran. For Israel and the U.S., Kurdish autonomous regions in Syria and Iraq also serve as a counterbalance to Iran’s proxy groups operating in both countries. But that is not the whole story, especially from the standpoint of Turkey. The Iranian missile retaliation against Israel, on the same day with Bahçeli’s handshake, signaled a potential escalation in the ongoing conflict between Iran and Israel. While a direct military intervention in Iran seems unlikely anytime soon, the possibility of internal crises within Iran cannot be ruled out. Both the U.S. and Israel appear prepared to exploit such a scenario, supporting opposition groups to destabilize and potentially topple the Iranian regime. Such developments could significantly alter the geopolitical landscape for the Kurds since Iran is home to the second-largest Kurdish population after Turkey. If Iran’s stability collapses, the chances of yet another autonomous Kurdish region emerging grow—an outcome that deeply unsettles Turkish leaders, who have long suppressed Kurdish aspirations both at home and abroad.

The prevailing Kurdish position on these developments, long advocated by Abdullah Öcalan and other prominent Kurdish leaders both within Turkey and across the region, is that Turkey should embrace its Kurdish neighbors rather than oppose them. This perspective envisions a symbiotic relationship in which Turkey’s democratization at home, combined with partnerships with Kurdish communities beyond its borders, could foster the mutual interests of both Turks and Kurds, creating a foundation for long-term peace and prosperity and strengthening Turkey as a regional actor.

Abdullah Öcalan: The Key to Turkey’s Gamble

Turkish leaders, however, do not share this vision. Given the strong connections between Kurdish organizations in Syria and Turkey, Turkey’s highly aggressive stance toward the Kurds in Syria, contrasted with its recent overtures toward peaceful dialogue with the Kurds in Turkey, creates a sense of contradiction. These contradictory positions indicate that the Turkish leaders have a different plan. For Turkey’s leaders, the formation of a de jure Kurdish autonomy in Syria constitutes an existential threat to Turkey. Dialogue with the Kurds in Turkey, therefore, can be understood as an attempt to stabilize internal dynamics and address domestic grievances that fuel the PKK insurgency, thereby isolating Kurdish organizations in Syria and reducing the potential for cross-border solidarity.

So far, however, their stated objective is neither to acknowledge Kurdish autonomy in Syria nor pursue a democratic resolution to the Kurdish issue in Turkey. Rather, it is to disarm Kurdish forces—both in Syria and within the PKK—without any promise for political concessions, recognition of Kurdish rights, or structural reforms that address the underlying grievances of the Kurdish population in Turkey. This raises a critical question: What is the basis for negotiations?

The most likely scenario from the Turkish perspective appears to be this: Offer the Kurds a final opportunity to disarm, and if they refuse, launch a comprehensive military invasion against the Syrian Kurds and the PKK, whose fighters are predominantly stationed in the mountainous regions of Iraqi Kurdistan. For Turkish leaders, the presence of some two thousand American troops among the Kurds in Syria is the only game-changing factor preventing such action. These troops act as both a deterrent and a complicating factor, as Turkey assumes that the U.S. will not cooperate against the Kurds. As a result, Turkish leaders seem to have reached a point where viable options are dwindling, leaving them compelled to act almost in a state of panic.

So long as the U.S. continues its presence in the region without aligning with Turkey, voluntary disarmament remains the only option. Turkish leaders believe that the only figure capable of convincing the Kurds, including those in Syria, to disarm is Abdullah Öcalan. Öcalan’s symbolic authority and influence over Kurdish factions make him key to their plan. However, it is highly unlikely that Öcalan would call for disarmament without significant concessions from Turkey regarding Kurdish autonomy in Syria.

Israel’s Strategic Role in Shaping U.S. Kurdish Policy and Regional Power Dynamics

Israel’s support for the Kurds and its advocacy for the American administration to maintain its alliance with them have the potential to shift the balance of power in favor of the Kurds. This makes Isreal’s role extremely important. In the long run, without the Israeli factor, the U.S. would be more likely to align with Turkey over the Kurds, as has historically been the case, given Turkey’s critical importance to U.S. global geopolitical interests. Thus far, key figures in the incoming Trump administration have signaled a commitment to continuing U.S. support for the Kurds. Additionally, the fact that these same figures are staunch supporters of Israel could further strengthen the overall U.S.-Israel backing for Kurdish autonomy.

Nevertheless, Trump’s historical unpredictability on foreign policy raises questions about whether the administration will prioritize longstanding alliances with Turkey or maintain support for the Kurdish forces that have been instrumental in the fight against ISIS. This delicate balance could redefine power dynamics in the region, particularly amid growing Israeli advocacy for Kurdish autonomy.

In navigating these precarious alliances, Turkey finds itself at a critical juncture where its historical ambitions, regional anxieties, and international pressures converge. The interplay between Kurdish autonomy, Israeli influence, and U.S. priorities will undoubtedly shape the future of Middle Eastern geopolitics, leaving Turkey with limited room for error. Whether through calculated diplomacy or forceful action, Ankara’s decisions in the coming weeks and months will not only redefine its role in the region but also determine the trajectory of the Kurdish question—a long-standing issue now tied to the shifting balance of global power.

Bio

Dr. Cevat Dargın is an Assistant Professor of Middle Eastern History at Norwich University. His academic expertise lies in the history and contemporary implications of modern state formation in the Middle East and North Africa. Dr. Dargın is currently working on a book manuscript tentatively titled Ottoman Roads to Dersim ‘38: Engineering the Global Middle East. He holds a PhD in Middle Eastern Studies from Princeton University and has previously held postdoctoral and visiting professorship positions at the University of Michigan and Columbia University.

[1] Hurriyet Daily News, Handshake with DEM Party shows ‘national unity’: Bahçeli, October 08, 2024. Accessed on January 18, 2025. https://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/handshake-with-dem-party-shows-national-unity-bahceli-201341?utm_source=chatgpt.com

[2] Euronews, Devlet Bahçeli, PKK lideri Öcalan’ı Meclis’te konuşma yapmaya çağırdı, October 22, 2024. Accessed on Jauary 16, 2025. https://tr.euronews.com/2024/10/22/devlet-bahceli-pkk-lideri-ocalani-mecliste-konusma-yapmaya-cagirdi?utm_source=chatgpt.com

[3] Routers, Turkish lawmakers discuss Mideast in closed session after Erdogan’s Israel claim, October 8, 2024. Accessed on Junuary 18, 2025. https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkish-lawmakers-discuss-mideast-closed-session-after-erdogans-israel-claim-2024-10-08/?utm_source=chatgpt.com

[4] The Jerusalem Post, FM Gideon Sa’ar: The regime in Damascus is ‘a gang – not a legitimate gov’t’. December 28, 2024. Accessed on January 17, 2025. https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/article-834857

[5] Presidency of the Republic of Turkiye, Directorate of Communications, Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan: “Amacımız yarım asırlık bölücü terör parantezinin kapatılmasıdır.” January 11, 2025. Accessed on January 15, 2025. https://www.iletisim.gov.tr/turkce/haberler/detay/cumhurbaskani-erdogan-amacimiz-yarim-asirlik-bolucu-teror-parantezinin-kapatilmasidir